United Park City Mines Co.  v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, Mayflower Recreational Fond, Stichting Mayflower Recreation, Consolidated Mayflower Mines, Inc., Royal Street of Utah, Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisenboerenleenbank, B.A, May Finance C.V., Deer Valley Resort Company, Newpark Resources : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2004
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds, Mayflower Recreational Fond,
Stichting Mayflower Recreation, Consolidated
Mayflower Mines, Inc., Royal Street of Utah,
Cooperative Centrale Raiffeisenboerenleenbank,
B.A, May Finance C.V., Deer Valley Resort
Company, Newpark Resources : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Craig Smay; attorney for appellants.
Unknown.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, United Park v. Stichting Mayflower, No. 20040943.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2551
E. Craig Smay #2985 
R CRAIG SMAY,P.C. 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ph:(801)539-8515 
Fx: (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Appellants. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., A 
DELAWARE CORPORATION, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
MOUNTAIN FONDS, a Netherlands 
association; MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FOND, a general 
partnership; STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATION; CONSOLIDATED 
MAYFLOWER MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; ROYAL STREET OF 
UTAH; COOPERATIVE CENTRALE 
RAIFFEISENBOERENLEENBANK, 
B.A., a Netherlands corporation; MAY 
FINANCE C.V.; DEER VALLEY 
RESORT COMPANY, a Utah limited 
partnership; NEWPARK RESOURCES, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation; 
Appellants, 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal Number: 20040943-SC 
Case Number: 000500087 
BRIEF 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
DOCKET HO. 2CP*CT*f?-Sr^ 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 0 9 2005 
E. Craig Smay #2985 
E. CRAIG SMAY, P.C. 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ph: (801) 539-8515 
Fx: (801) 539-8544 
Attorney for Appellants. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES CO., A 
DELAWARE CORPORATION, 
Appellee, 
vs. 
STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
MOUNTAIN FONDS, a Netherlands 
association; MAYFLOWER 
RECREATIONAL FOND, a general 
partnership; STICHTING MAYFLOWER 
RECREATION; CONSOLIDATED 
MAYFLOWER MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; ROYAL STREET OF 
UTAH; COOPERATIVE CENTRALE 
RAIFFEISENBOERENLEENBANK, 
B.A., a Netherlands corporation; MAY 
FINANCE C.V.; DEER VALLEY 
RESORT COMPANY, a Utah limited 
partnership; NEWPARK RESOURCES, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation; 
Appellants, 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal Number: 20040943-SC 
Case Number: 000500087 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
INTRODUCTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
MATTERS "NOT APPEALED" 5 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 6 
THE ADMITTED WAIVER WAS ALSO . . . 8 
A PROMISE TO ACCOUNT AND SHARE 
THE SEPARATE CLAIMS FOR ACCOUNTING . . 13 
AND OWELTY 
IT WASN'T WAIVER: IT WAS FRAUD . . . 14 
THE REFEREES' REPORT 17 
THE QUID QUO PRO 20 
CONCLUSIONS 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Becksteadv. Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 153 (Utah 1992). 
STATE STATUTES 
§ 78-39-12, U.C.A. (1953) 
§ 78-39-41, U.C.A. (1953) 
RULES 
Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellee's Brief has great difficulty presenting a coherent rationale for the 
Judgment it attempts to defend. 
Thus, appellee asserts that, in response to appellee's claim "throughout the 
proceedings below that the Mayflower Defendants were not entitled to any owelty" (Brief 
at 18, n. 2), the referees and District Court found no "inequality" which could justify 
"owelty" in the physical partition ordered. Brief at 26-29. Still, appellee is compelled to 
argue that, "The trial Court's award of owelty to the Mayflower defendants, consisting of 
entitlements for four lots in the Northside Neighborhood, is not clearly erroneous." Brief 
at 24. 
Unable to explain why the District Court ignored appellants' demand for an 
accounting set out in the stipulated Pretrial Order (§ II, B. 2), appellee is compelled to 
pretend that the wholly undefended claim for accounting was just a claim for "owelty" 
(Brief at 24), which, despite the District Court's necessarily implied finding that "a 
partition cannot be made equally among the parties without prejudice to [one] of them", did 
not impose upon appellee the burden to show the "net value" of its admitted use of the 
co-tenancy in its admittedly exclusive development scheme. 
Failing to explain the District Court's inexplicable inversion of appellee's 
unequivocal testimony that its faxed promise to appellants represented that it would not 
seek partition having first annexed and accepted a density approval for appellants' property, 
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appellee is compelled to explain the admitted waiver as merely a fraud, secretly intended to 
be withdrawn on the eve of the annexation and Development Agreement. Brief at 22-23. 
Finally, there being no justification for use of the parties' properties jointly, at the 
demand of Park City, to achieve approval of far more development than could have been 
obtained by use of the properties separately, then bringing an action to separate the 
properties, according the whole enhanced development to appellee's land, appellee resorts 
to a claim that such exclusive use of a co-tenancy, however profitable, is not compensable 
unless it causes out-of-pocket loss. Brief at 37-41. 
The difficulty in explaining and defending the Judgment is that, while it recognized 
that the partition imposed permits appellee to use appellants' property for very substantial 
profits to appellee, the District Court declined to order an accounting and sharing of this 
development, not because it was not required by law, but because to do so required a further 
proceeding. 
In fact, the District Court found, in keeping with the referees' finding, that a simple 
partition was unequal and prejudicial without an award to appellants of part of the 
approvals obtained by appellee's use of the co-tenancy. Ruling, 07/13/04 at 5-6. It was 
unnecessary for appellants to show "great prejudice" as that is only the standard for 
requiring sale in lieu of partition. § 78-39-12, U.C.A. (1953). 
In fact, appellee explicitly and unequivocally waived the right to seek partition to 
enforce a "density determination" for appellants' property to which appellant did not 
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consent. The District Court simply misperceived the unequivocal testimony. In fact, the 
District Court failed to observe that appellee's promise, in the context in which appellee's 
president testified it occurred, was that appellee would not seek partition without a "joint 
venture" for "joint development", accounting for and sharing proportionally the 
development obtained by its use of the co-tenancy. 
In fact, the District Court simply ignored a proper demand for an accounting, which 
imposed no burden upon appellants to show the "net value" of appellee's admitted gain 
from exclusive use of the co-tenancy, and entitled appellants to a proportional share thereof 
regardless of out-of-pocket loss. 
In fact, the District Court thus imposed upon appellants, as a condition to obtaining 
"owelty", a burden to show "what the 'net value' of the Northside Neighborhood 
development lots would be" and "the fair market value of the Northside Neighborhood lots 
minus the development costs [thereof]", prior to the final definition and approval of such 
lots, while their sale was illegal, and before any admissible evidence of "net value" existed. 
This burden belonged to appellee as a matter of law as well as of its promise to appellants. 
The District Court allowed appellee to avoid it, because requiring appellee to provide the 
accounting it owed "at this point would require an expensive trial." 
In fact, the District Court purported to enforce the "owelty" determination of a 
"majority" of two of three referees, after one of the two had "changed his mind" and formed 
a new majority with the third in recommending a larger allocation to appellants. Ruling, 
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07/13/04, at 5-6. Appellants made all the showing necessary to engage the District Court's 
"power to make compensatory adjustment among parties according to the principles of 
equity." § 78-39-41, U.C.A. (1953). They failed to obtain an appropriate award because 
the District Court, ignoring an uncontested claim for an accounting and misperceiving 
appellee's promise not to seek partition without providing one, imposed an improper 
burden of proof. 
The proper disposition here was simple: decline to partition unless and until appellee 
kept its promise not to partition without accounting for and sharing the development. If, 
because appellee brought its action before finalizing the approvals obtained or pricing the 
development, an admissible accounting required a further proceeding, so be it. It was not 
for the District Court to avoid the "expense" of an accounting by imposing upon appellants 
the far greater expense of theft of their property rights. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee's Statement of the Case and Course of Proceedings is a thinly veiled, but 
not very acute, argument. 
Appellee's re-interpretation of the Referees' proceedings and Recommendation is 
essentially irrelevant. The evidence showed that the Referees had been denied crucial 
information, namely, that annexation of appellants' land was a condition to developing 
appellee's land. Had the information been provided, the "neutral" referee would have sided 
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with the minority referee, to form a different majority. Ruling 07/13/04 at 5-6. Thus, the 
so-called Majority Recommendation evaporated at trial. 
In fact, the only function played by the Referees' Report in this case was to provide 
the District Court a basis appellee could not dispute for awarding part of the approvals to 
appellants, after it had concluded that the physical partition sought by appellee was 
inequitable, but declined to order the accounting due because "to do so at this point would 
require an expensive trial" of evidence not yet available. 
MATTERS "NOT APPEALED" 
The point of appellee's specification of findings and conclusions not appealed is not 
obvious. 
While it is true that appellants do not directly challenge any of the District Court's 
Findings of Fact labeled as such, this disposes in entirety of appellees' claim about failure 
to marshal the evidence. Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P.: the requirement to marshal the evidence 
applies only to contests of findings. The District Court's finding of no "great prejudice" 
goes only to whether a sale was required in lieu of partition. § 78-39-12, U.C.A. (1953). 
Of course, Appellants have appealed whether the partition ordered is "fair and 
equitable", because they assert that a different sharing of the development was required. 
This includes any permissible appeal of the Referees' Report, insofar as it is incorporated 
in the Judgment. 
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The property in Wasatch County, not being affected by appellee's development 
scheme with Park City, is irrelevant to this appeal. Appellants did not appeal the 
annexation, at least in part because they are statutorily prohibited from doing so. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee's statement of Issues Presented for Review outlines both the errors of the 
Judgment, and of appellee's attempted defense of the judgment. 
Appellee states "Issue No. 1", as "was the trial court's finding that United Park did 
not intend to waive its inherent right to partition the jointly owned real property clearly 
erroneous?" Appellee asserts, further, that appellants were required to "marshal the 
evidence" in support of such finding and demonstrate its error. 
In fact, there is no such finding of the District Court. There is Conclusion of Law 
No. 23, which states that a certain fax "did not evidence an intent . . . to waive . . . . " It is 
questionable, therefore, whether, under Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P., marshalling of evidence is 
required. 
Nevertheless, appellants have marshaled all the evidence. Appellee is unable to 
designate any pertinent evidence overlooked. 
What the evidence shows is not only appellee's waiver of partition in the 
circumstances of this case, but appellee's written promise not to go forward without a "joint 
venture" of the development with appellant, rejoining an accounting and sharing of the 
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subject development. 
Appellee now concedes that the marshaled evidence about the fax constitutes "an 
indication", "at the time the 1997 fax was written and reconfirmed", "that [appellee] did not 
intend . . . to" - intended not to - "annex [and 'accept a density approval for'] the 
Mayflower Property", without appellants' "permission to move forward". Such permission 
was to be achieved by "negotiating] a joint venture" with appellants to share the 
development. Brief of Appellee at 23. Appellee does not dispute that the partition action 
was brought expressly to avoid such negotiation and appellants' demand that appellee 
account for and share the development. That is, by permitting appellee a partition without 
accounting for and sharing the development, the District Court permitted appellee to breach 
its written promise to appellants. 
Appellee's "Issue No. 2" is whether the "ruling that the Mayflower Defendants 
should be awarded as 'owelty' . . . four . . . 'conditional lots'. . . . " was erroneous in light 
of "an express finding of fact that there was no evidence to support . . . entitlement to 
additional owelty " Again, there is no such finding of fact. There is Conclusion of Law 
No. 28, that "no evidence was produced as a basis for the Mayflower Defendant's claims 
for" particular shares of the development. This ruling must reflect Finding of Fact No. 19 
that "no evidence was presented at the time of trial of what the 'net value' ['fair market 
value . . . minus the development costs'] of the Northside Neighborhood development lots 
would be . . . ." No one could carry that burden, however it was assigned, of proof of 
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non-existent, future facts. Because assigning the burden to appellee required a further 
proceeding, the District Court simply concluded that the burden was not met. 
THE ADMITTED WAIVER WAS ALSO A PROMISE TO ACCOUNT AND 
SHARE 
The significance of Mr. Rothwell's testimony quoted at pages 24-25 of Appellants' 
Brief must be emphasized. It shows on its face a promise not to seek partition in certain 
circumstances. It also shows an agreement to account for and fairly share the entire 
Flagstaff Development: 
Q: You nevertheless promised that you ["] would not annex your property or 
accept a density approval for your property "without your notification and 
permission." What did you mean by "permission" in that phrase, Mr. 
Rothwell? 
A: My hope had been that we would be able to negotiate a joint venture with 
our land owning partners, with Mayflower, and thereby achieve a permission 
to move forward. 
Q: And lacking that, your representation was that you will not annex or 
accept the density approval. 
A: At that time it was. 
Tr. 88: 7-89: 5. This promise headed off an earlier proposal about partitioning the 
co-tenancy in advance, and removing appellants' share, to enable appellants to negotiate 
with Park City separately. Tr. 88: 6-11. 
To obtain "permission to move forward" with appellants' land included required 
entry into a joint venture to share the development. This reflects appellants' Fact No. 8 
(Brief at 8) wholly uncontested by appellee: 
UPCM represented to Park City that it would enter into a joint venture with 
other owners of land in the Flagstaff Annexation to share the development 
proposed by UPCM, and that UPCM was, therefore, a proper representative 
of all owners in negotiating the annexation and development plan with Park 
City. Tr. 53-54, 100-101, 177-178; Exhibit 7. 
The testimony at the cited Transcript pages 100-101 concerned charts (Exhibit 7; see also 
Exhibits 4, 5, and 6) attached to draft joint venture agreements proposed by appellee: 
Q: What these charts do, Mr. Rothwell, is calculate a participant's share in 
an overall based upon the status of the application at the time. Is that not 
correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: To be clear about that, when I say the status of the application at the time, 
that means the sort of densities and development you were discussing at the 
time whether the city approved it or not. 
A: Yes. These, were, these were not approved densities. 
Q: These are all prospective in that way? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: And so what you were informing the owners here is that if you were 
successful in doing what you were then attempting to do these were the sort 
of returns they might expect? 
A: Yes. 
A brief review of the charts in reference shows that appellee proposed to divide 
among participating land owners the total development permitted by Park City in the 
Flagstaff Annexation, on various bases of contribution of the various owners, including 
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contribution of developable acreage. In none of the various proposals was a minority 
owner required to accept the "base density" of his property under the original Summit 
County zoning. Of course, the proposals for sharing were made by appellee (see Tr. 
103-104), based upon an accounting of amounts, types and value of approvals obtainable, 
because the minority owners did not have access to information allowing them to formulate 
such a proposal. 
Mr. RothweH's testimony, therefore, was that appellee promised appellant in writing 
that appellee would not proceed with the development except upon the basis of a joint 
venture agreement sharing proportionally the increased development obtained by pooling 
the properties, and that appellee would not resort to unilateral annexation and re-zoning, 
followed by partition, to avoid this responsibility. 
The Complaint recites: 
13. United Park desires to proceed with the development of its portion of 
the Summit County property, pursuant to and in accordance with the 
terms of the Development Agreement. United Park also desires to 
proceed with efforts to obtain approvals from Wasatch County with 
respect to the development of its portions of the Wasatch County 
Property as quickly as possible. 
13. Since October of 1998, United Park has attempted to negotiate with 
Stichting Mountain and Stichting Recreational in order to reach an 
agreement regarding the joint development or partition of the property. 
13. Stichting Mountain and Stichting Recreational have been unwilling to 
engage in serious discussions or negotiations with United Park with 
respect to either the partition or joint development of the Property. 
13. Consequently, United Park has filed this action seeking partition of the 
Property. 
That is, appellee recognized the duty to negotiate a proportional sharing of the whole 
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development, even after completion of the annexation. The Complaint's recognition of a 
duty to negotiate "joint development or partition" obviates any claim appellee could insist 
upon partition alone, where appellant demanded an accounting and "joint development". 
The District Court's order allowing partition to go forward without an accounting and 
sharing of the development, was simply authorization to appellee to violate its promise with 
impunity. Equity, which governs partition, requires a different result. 
The evidence, tried without objection and in conformity with the Pretrial Order, 
shows an agreement not to withdraw appellants' property from the Flagstaff development 
project, in return for negotiating a proportional sharing of the development approved. Any 
such sharing required the kind of accounting of the development exemplified by the chart, 
Exhibits 7, which only appellee could provide. The February 25, 1997 FAX is a 
satisfactory written memorial of the agreement. While the latter part of the agreement 
might be objected to as an unenforceable agreement to agree, insisting upon that rule simply 
voids the consideration upon which appellant's property was included, when it can no 
longer be withdrawn. This creates a fraud. 
Of course, the evidence also shows appellees' violation of the agreement, in the 
form of the partition. Appellee agreed not to proceed without a joint venture, which 
required it to account for and share the development. It agreed that it would not seek 
partition without accounting and sharing. It then sued, acknowledging the obligation to 
negotiate "joint development", of which an accounting by appellee and sharing of the 
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approvals are essential parts. If the District Court did not deny partition to force appellee 
to account and share, it had to order an accounting to force appellee to account and share. 
While appellee may object that appellants could not force appellee to accept particular 
terms for sharing, by seeking partition it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court 
upon the representation that it will abide by the court's decision of the matter. If appellee 
seeks partition it cannot object that appellant seeks accounting and distribution. 
Appellee's agreement to account and share may be enforced in equity without need 
to show "exclusive use" or "profit" under the usual rule about accounting among co-tenants; 
or it may be taken as an admission of these elements of exclusive use and profit. Nor can 
appellee now object that the accounting provided by appellants to the District Court is 
rudimentary or less exact than possible, having rejected the opportunity to provide the more 
complete or more exact accounting which it alone could provide. Appellee does not object 
that appellants used inaccurate figures for the total development approved. Appellee was 
unable to show any inaccuracy in the calculation of appellants' fourteen percent (14%) 
contribution of developable acreage. 1 Of course, appellee cannot claim that contribution 
of developable acreage is an irrational basis for sharing, as it was proposed by appellee 
itself in discussions for the purpose prior to the annexation. See Exhibit 7. 
Certainly, it is no objection to this that "No evidence was presented at the time of 
Trial what the 'net value' of the Northside Neighborhood development lots would be and to 
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do so at this point would require an expensive trial to determine the fair market value of the 
Northside Neighborhood lots minus the development costs of the Northside Neighborhood 
lots." Judgment, Finding of Fact No. 11. The other thing it would require was completion 
of the approval process and contracting the development costs to provide anything other 
than a wholly speculative basis for an opinion what net value 'Svould be", in order to make 
the evidence admissible at all. In any case, the district Court was not at liberty to excuse 
appellee's duty because compliance was "expensive" or inconvenient. 
THE SEPARATE CLAIMS FOR ACCOUNTING AND OWELTY 
There is no response, in the District Court's ruling or in appellee's brief, to 
appellants' demand for an accounting, or to the admission that appellee promised an 
accounting and sharing of the development as a condition to going ahead. 
Appellee pretends instead that appellants' demand for an accounting was somehow 
indistinct from a claim for owelty, and could be dealt with simultaneously by insisting that 
appellants had the burden of proof on the issue of owelty. In fact, the District Court simply 
never came to grips with an entirely proper and separate demand for an accounting. Owelty 
was only invoked as a power of the court to make equitable adjustments among the parties. 
Even absent appellee's promise, two rules would apply here: (1) where any available 
physical partition benefits one co-tenant discriminatorily, the Court may adjust the equities 
1 Appellee's cynical claim that Mr. Theobald failed to explain the basis for his calculation of fourteen percent because, 
when asked for the constituent numbers, Mr. Theobald volunteered to retrieve them, but counsel told him it was 
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by an award of "owelty"; and (2) where the imbalance is the profit from one co-tenant's 
exclusive use of the co-tenancy, the profiteer must account for it and share it proportionally. 
The District Court simply never grasped the fact that once it is shown that any physical 
division of the land must give one party more than the other, a fact found by the District 
Court here, the burden shifts to the benefited party to quantify the imbalance if it results 
from his exclusive use of the co-tenancy, a fact admitted here. The rule applicable where 
the imbalance is no co-tenant's fault has no application here. 
IT WASN'T WAIVER; IT WAS FRAUD 
Appellee now defends its written promise to appellants that partition would not be 
sought after appellants' land had been annexed and re-zoned without their consent, by 
cynically re-defining the promise as a fraud. "[I]t is reasonable to construe this testimony 
simply as an indication by Mr. Rothwell that he did not intend, at the time the 1997 fax was 
written and re-confirmed, to annex the Mayflower Property (as opposed to the Summit 
County Partition Property) without Mr. Bogerd's permission." Brief at 23. Thus, though 
appellee never expressed any such limitation on the promise to appellants, it was free to 
break the promise as soon as the words were out of Mr. Rothwell's mouth. (Further, though 
the promise speaks only of "your property", appellee was free to regard it as applicable only 
to the "Mayflower Property . . . as opposed to the Summit County Partition Property", 
unnecessary, deserves no consideration. See Tr. 234: 22-25; 235: 1-12; Appellee's Brief at 30, n. 14. 
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though both were undoubtedly "yours".) 
This gambit is trumped by the case relied upon by the District Court, Beckstead v. 
Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 153 (Utah 1992), which disallows avoiding an express 
waiver by claiming a secret intent to the contrary. 
Nor is the fraud excused by appellees' apparent claim that the promise was 
subsequently withdrawn by "Mr. Rothwell's subsequent communications with Mr. Bogerd, 
including his 1998 telephone conversation and the January 1999 letter, in which he 
informed the Mayflower defendants that United Park was in fact proceeding with the 
proposed annexation and development." The phone call and letter are described at pp. 
21-22 of appellees' Brief. 
Of course, as a general rule a written promise cannot be orally withdrawn. This 
eliminates the alleged phone call if withdrawal was its purpose. Nevertheless, it exposes 
the depth of appellees' cynicism to address the alleged call. It is cited to Mr. Rothwell's 
testimony, Tr. 43: 2-44: 14. 
The cited testimony begins: 
Q: And at any point in time after you sent and reconfirmed Exhibit U did you 
send Mr. Bogerd a letter indicating that United Park was proceeding with its 
development plans? 
A: I did not 
It is true that Mr. Rothwell said, "We had notified Mr. Bogerd by phone that we were 
moving forward with annexation and development." Tr. 43: 24-44:1. No date or time, 
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however, is indicated. Further, the purpose of this communication 66was to bring to fruition 
a, a negotiation . . . that we had attempted to have with Mayflower in regards to a joint 
venture proposal to move forward with the development of the jointly owned property." 
Tr. 44: 1-5. Further on, in this testimony, a letter from Bogerd to Park City is identified: 
A: I n . . . yes, about the same date that it was written. This was a, a, we were 
negotiating with Park City in a, in September, August and September of '98 
for, around the development parameters they were called at that time for the 
annexation of the property. And a, this was a letter sent by Mr. Bogerd 
objecting to the annexation, and the letter was read into the public record in 
Park City as part of the process. 
Tr. 45: 5-12. The Bogerd letter, dated September 3, 1998, recites a local newspaper 
announcement that the annexation proposal was to be called for a vote September 3, 1998 
and protests. 
In fact, as appellee acknowledges (Statement of Facts, ^ 11, p. 15, Brief), "on 
September 15, 1998" (actually, September 10, 1998 according to Park City Ordinance 
99-30, Tab E, Appendix to Brief of Appellee), the Park City Council approved the 
proposed annexation and development parameters. (Ordinance 99-30 was not actually 
finalized until June 24, 1999, but the delay was unrelated to the dispute between these 
parties. No further vote was taken.) Thus, if appellees' point is to connect the alleged 
phone call to the events of early September 1998, the only conclusion to be drawn is that 
appellee, at the eleventh hour, advised appellants that they were about to be annexed and 
re-zoned against their will, and appellants' last ditch effort to avoid this result failed. 
Mr. RothwelPs subsequent letter of January 21, 1999 (see testimony recited p. 25, 
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Brief of Appellants) offered the cold comfort that appellee would take advantage of the 
vote it had procured to "finalize our plans with Park City Municipal and delete Mayflower 
property from that Master Planning effort." Either this was a false representation that 
appellants' land would be spared the restrictions imposed on it by the September vote, or a 
cynical threat to deny it any benefits of the vote. 
The suggestion that these communications somehow advised appellants that they 
had been tricked by the earlier promise, and allowed them opportunity to save themselves, 
is cynical hogwash. At best, they advised appellants that the trap had been sprung. This is 
confessed by Mr. Rothwell's last testimony on the representation that appellee would 
"delete Mayflower property from the master planning effort": 
Q: That really could not [be] done without deleting them from the annexation, 
could it? 
A: No. 
Tr. 90: 1-3. 
THE REFEREES' REPORT 
When the referees investigated and wrote their report, they did not speak to any Park 
City official. Tr.137: 13-19. The UPCM officers and employees to whom they did speak 
did not inform them that Park City would not approve any development on any property, 
unless it was able to annex to the Summit County boundary. Tr.138: 25-140: 1. Thus, the 
Referees' Report does not ask whether the quid pro quo for approving density on appellee's 
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"lower mountain" property was annexing and down-zoning the "upper mountain", 
including appellants' property. Regarding whether "base density" under the one unit per 
forty acres Summit County zoning had been "transferred" from the "upper mountain" to the 
"lower mountain", they concluded that "base density" had simply been clustered in one area 
of the "upper mountain". As a result, the Referees' Report deals only with proportional 
allocation of the area of clustering of "base density" on the "upper mountain". Tr. 139: 
16-25; 140: 1. 
These matters were clarified at trial, and appellee's witness, Mr. Rosecrans, 
unequivocally testified that had he known what appellee now admits - that Park City's 
condition for annexing and permitting development on appellee's land was that it annex 
and limit development on appellants' equally developable land (Appellee's Brief at 13, % 
5; uncontested Fact No. 18, p. 11, Brief of Appellants) - he would have insisted on a greater 
allocation of "density" to appellants. Tr. 151: 19-152: 13; Ruling, 07/13/04 at 5-6. 
Appellee now asserts that appellants have claimed "transfer of density" and engages in 
deceptive editing of the transcript to create the impression that the referees, being fully 
informed, found that no such claimed "transfer of density" had occurred. 
The overall burden of Mr. Rothwell's and Mr. Theobald's testimony is that such 
conclusions as the Referees may have drawn about re-assigning "transferred density" were 
based on a lack of information; provided the facts testified to by appellee's witnesses 
Rothwell and Jackson, Mr. Rosecrans would have joined Mr. Theobald and reached 
18 
opposite conclusions. The District Court plainly caught the drift: Tr. 163: 9-16): 
THE JUDGE [to Mr. Rosecrans]: And if I can summarize your testimony 
now that you've been made aware of the fact that a, that Park City was 
demanding that there be full, to approve annexation it had to be annexation to 
the Wasatch County line that a, your, you think that there might possibly be 
a need for additional compensation for the perceived or allocation of density 
from the upper mountain to the lower mountain? 
The District Court agreed with "two referees, Mr. Rosecrans and Mr. Theobald" that 
"the whole quantum of development allowed . . . for the Flagstaff Annexation" "must be 
shared proportionally among the parties in order to render any partition equitable." Ruling 
07/13/04 at 4-5. It found, however, that "no evidence was produced as a basis for "the share 
of development claimed by Mayflower." Id. at 5. 
This was because "no evidence was presented at the time of trial what the 'net value' 
of the Northside Neighborhood development lots would be and to do so at this point would 
require an expensive trial to determine the fair market value of the Northside Neighborhood 
lots minus the development costs of the Northside Neighborhood lots." Finding No. 19. 
Appellee brought its partition action before it applied for final approvals for the 
development in the Flagstaff Annexation. That is, the ultimate number, location, size and 
type of the units of permissible development or their costs or value, were not known when 
the partition was conducted and the ruling issued. No doubt this choice was made to allow 
appellee maximum flexibility in obtaining final approval for the maximum amount of 
development. Appellee sought a partition which gave to appellee all land zoned for 
development in the Flagstaff Annexation, according appellant none of it. 
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Thus, the burden of proof to "determine the fair market value" of the development, 
or "what the 'net value' . . . would be" - was impossible to carry no matter who bore it. The 
District Court declined to contemplate a further proceeding in which such proof could be 
provided, because "to do so at this point would require an expensive trial." 
In short, the District Court has permitted appellee, by controlling the timing of the 
partition action, to control the result. 
It seems plain that the questionable rationale of this decision also affected the 
District Court's decision whether appellee had waived a partition in the circumstances. The 
rationale that appellee's president had "testified unequivocally that he was not 
contemplating a partition of the joint property at the time the note was written and that he 
never intended to waive United Park's right to partition", is simply false: there was no such 
testimony. The real rationale was that refusing a partition pending the accounting and 
sharing of the development promised, would require a further "expensive" proceeding. 
THE QUID QUO PRO 
Appellee now asserts that appellants did not show that the quid pro quo for allowing 
development of appellee's land was annexing and restricting development on appellants' 
land. In fact, however, appellee admits this: 
5. Park City insisted on extension of the proposed annexation to the Summit 
County line. See Final Order & J. at |^ 15, appended hereto at Tab A; Tr. at 
36: 9-20, R. at 1250. Park City also insisted that it would not annex without 
a development agreement defining the amount, type and approximate 
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location of development permissible within the annexed property, and 
imposed other requirements. See Final Order & J. at 5, f^ 14., R. at 1250, 
appended hereto at Tab A. 
Brief of Appellee at 13 (emphasis added). The quid pro quo for a Development Agreement 
locating all enhanced development on appellee's land was inclusion of appellants' land in 
the same Development Agreement, which located no such development on appellants' land. 
It was unnecessary to call Park City witnesses on these points. As appellee's Brief now 
admits, the parties' testimony about them was entirely consistent. 
Appellee does no better with the claim that Rothwell's testimony shows that Park 
City annexed simply to "avoid islands and peninsulas of unincorporated property." 
Rothwell's attempt to testify what Park City told him about this was stricken (Tr. 35:25,36: 
1-8) and appellee's current claim about Mr. Rothwell's "understanding" of the City's 
motives is belied by appellee's present admission that Park City annexed "to maintain 
control over the development in the area of the proposed Flagstaff Mountain Resort". Brief 
at 14, f 10. The latter reflects Mr. Jackson's testimony as well that "it was Park City's 
fanatic desire to control development...." Tr. 266: 5-6. 
Nor does appellee correctly describe annexation. The record here indicates that 
appellee sought a partition by which appellants received a consolidated parcel on the 
Summit/Wasatch County boundary. In fact, that is the result of the present partition. There 
is no reason to suppose appellants could not have achieved this in their own proceeding. In 
that case, there would have been no owner's signature on the annexation petition for this 
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land, nor would it have been enclosed within land the owners of more than fifty percent of 
which had signed, and it could not have been annexed. 
The suggestion, in any case, that any ability of appellee to force appellants into an 
annexation carried with it power to down-zone appellants' land by agreement between Park 
City and appellee, ignores the prohibition against contract zoning. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no substantial dispute of facts in this case. 
Appellee sought to annex its property to Park City to foster a development scheme 
that sought to greatly increase the native density permitted for the land under its Summit 
County zoning by clustering on discrete parcels. Park City declined to annex, unless it also 
got control of appellants' property, the bulk of which was a co-tenancy with appellee, to 
prevent its use in a similar scheme under Summit County jurisdiction. 
Only appellee's signature was needed to include the latter property in the annexation 
petition, but appellants could have thwarted the addition by seeking partition in advance. 
Appellee, therefore, promised that it would not go forward with the annexation and 
development scheme except upon entering a joint venture with appellants for any 
development approved. It informed Park City that it would make such a joint venture; thus, 
it was empowered unilaterally to negotiate development parameters with Park City. Any 
such joint venture necessarily required an accounting and sharing of the development. 
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In fact, appellee prosecuted and obtained the annexation without a joint venture. 
The development scheme imposed approved preliminarily a vastly enhanced developability 
on appellee's land alone. It limited appellants' land to its native density under the Summit 
County zoning, and eliminated all opportunity for enhanced development. 
The Complaint appears to confess that Park City then sent appellee back to negotiate 
a fair sharing of the development with appellants prior to seeking final approvals. Instead, 
appellee filed the present partition action, demanding that all land zoned for development 
by Park City be partitioned to appellee. 
Upon being fully informed of the facts, a majority of referees appointed by the 
District Court concurred that a proportional sharing of the entire development preliminarily 
approved was essential to any equitable partition. 
The partition action, however, preceded final approval of the amount, location, size 
and type of the development, and any reasonable basis for assessing costs of development 
and market values. Thus, except for defining a proportional share of a not-yet defined total, 
accounting for the development and sharing it monetarily, requires a further proceeding. 
An order denying partition pending the accounting and sharing promised by appellee, 
would require a further proceeding. 
The District Court was determined to avoid a further proceeding. It selected 
injustice in lieu of inconvenience. 
To avoid the obvious waiver of a partition without an accounting and sharing, the 
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District Court inverted the testimony of appellee's president regarding an acknowledged 
promise not to proceed without appellants' consent. To avoid a further proceeding, the 
District Court relied upon a Referee's Report no longer supported by a majority of referees. 
It finessed its refusal to deal with appellants' demand for an accounting from appellee, by 
merely concluding, without actually assigning the burden of proof, that "no evidence was 
produced" of the value of appellee's profits. It calculated "owelty" on a basis its own 
Ruling acknowledges is inadequate, justifying the ruling on the ground that evidence of 
future value which did not then exist was not then produced. 
The Judgment must be reversed, and remanded to the District Court to take 
appropriate steps to sequester proceeds of the development, pending a further proceeding 
accounting for net value of the development finally approved and sold, and sharing of such 
value in the proportion established in the initial proceeding. 
DATED this 9th day of August, 2005. 
s 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for Mayiower 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "REPLY 
BRIEF " to be mailed this 9th day of August, 2005, to the following: 
Laura S. Scott (6649) 
Michael Petrogeorge (8870) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for UPCM 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
fx: (801) 536-6111 
E. Craig Smay \ 
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